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Abstract
Background: African policy-makers are increasingly considering abolishing user fees as a solution
to improve access to health care systems. There is little evidence on this subject in West Africa,
and particularly in countries that have organized their healthcare system on the basis of the Bamako
Initiative. This article presents a process evaluation of an NGO intervention to abolish user fees in
Niger for children under five years and pregnant women.
Methods: The intervention was launched in 2006 in two health districts and 43 health centres.
The intervention consisted of abolishing user fees and improving the quality of services (drugs,
ambulance, etc.). We carried out a process evaluation in April 2007 using qualitative and
quantitative data. Three data collection methods were used: i) individual in-depth interviews (n =
85) and focus groups (n = 8); ii) participant observation in 12 health centres; and iii) self-
administered structured questionnaires (n = 51 health staff).
Results: The population favoured abolition; health officials and local decision-makers were in
favour, but they worried about its sustainability. Among health workers, opposition to providing
free services was more widespread. The strengths of the process were: a top-down phase of
information and raising community awareness; appropriate incentive measures; a good drug supply
system; and the organization of a medical evacuation system. The major weaknesses of the process
were: the perverse effects of incentive bonuses; the lack of community-based management
committees' involvement in the management; the creation of a system running in parallel with the
BI system; the lack of action to support the service offer; and the poor coordination of the
availability of free services at different levels of the health pyramid. Some unintended outcomes are
also documented.
Conclusion: The linkages between systems in which some patients pay (Bamako Initiative) and
some do not should be carefully considered and organized in accordance with the local reality. For
the poorest patients to really benefit, it is essential that, at the same time, the quality of services be
improved and mechanisms be put in place to prevent abuses. Much remains to be done to generate
knowledge on the processes for abolishing fees in West Africa.
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Background
For Africa to attain the Millenium Development Goals,
the challenges remain vast, especially with regard to infant
and maternal mortality [1]. Improved access to health
care contributes to achieving these objectives [2,3]. How-
ever, in many countries this access is very much con-
strained because patients must pay for services, whereas
abolishing user fees has the potential to save around
230000 children under age five each year in 20 African
countries [4]. "Alleviating financial barriers must become
a priority for policymakers if their will is really to acceler-
ate the reduction of maternal and perinatal mortality in
the developing word," a group of researchers recently
affirmed [3]. Our study was carried out in Niger (West
Africa), where, in 1995, the government decided to gener-
alize the Bamako Initiative (BI), user fees, community
participation, and the utilization of essential drugs. The
objective was to improve the quality and utilization of
health care services. Ten years later, service utilization
remains very low, especially because the State has reduced
its financial contribution and not all patients have the
means to pay [5,6]. In Africa, user fees have constrained
access to care [7,8], notably in Niger [6,9], pushing some
families into poverty [10]. Alternative strategies against
health care exclusion that are based on community-based
health insurance (CBHI), on family solidarity, or even on
targeted exemptions have not yet produced the desired
results. There is no evidence of the progressiveness of
CBHI, they are not targeted to the worst-off, and their pen-
etration rate is low (maximum 10%). Family solidarity is
eroded, and exemption schemes either do not work or
have been co-opted by other than the needy [11-15]. In
fact, implementing targeted exemptions in Africa is a chal-
lenge [16].
User fees abolition
Decision-makers are searching for solutions, one of which
is the abolition of user fees for all, or at least for easily tar-
geted beneficiaries (e.g. children under five and pregnant
women). Except for some recent studies in Ghana and
Senegal, where user fees for deliveries were abolished [17-
19], there is, as of yet, no evidence on this subject in West
Africa, and particularly in countries that have organized
their health care system on the basis of the Bamako Initi-
ative (BI). However, some southern and eastern African
countries have abolished user fees. In most cases, results
have been immediate and positive, with increased utiliza-
tion of health care services among children under five. In
Uganda, new cases treated increased by 18.5% for chil-
dren under five nationwide after the abolition in 2001
[20], and 27% in another study in 10 districts [21]. The
poor had benefited more than others in terms of health
care utilization [20,22,23] but not for catastrophic health
expenditures [23]. By way of contrast, in Ghana the richest
households had a decline in out-of-pocket payments of
21%, while the decline in poor households was 13.18%.
However, the proportion of facility-based deliveries
increased in every socio-economic quintile, but the great-
est increases were in the two poorest [24]. In South Africa
the positive effect of abolition on curative care for chil-
dren in 1994 (+77%) was undermined by little or no
increase in preventive care (immunization and growth
monitoring) [25]. In Zambia, utilization of rural health
facilities was estimated to have increased 55% over the 12
months following the removal of user fees in 2006
(excluding children under five) [26]. In Burundi, three
months after fees were abolished at hospitals in May
2006, average monthly outpatient visits by children had
increased 42% and inpatient stays, 87% [27]. In Madagas-
car, the (temporary) abolition of user fees in 2002 dou-
bled the average monthly visits in December compared
with the previous year (117 vs. 208), and health staff per-
ceived the main reason to be the abolition of user fees.
Researchers affirm that abolition of user fees is associated
with a 22% increase in visits to health centres, after con-
trolling for supply effects (i.e., proxy of quality) [28].
As we see, researchers have concentrated primarily on
demonstrating the outcomes of this abolition policy. Our
literature review shows that documenting the process has
not received much attention from researchers [29]. There
were, however, exceptions, and these experiences have
shown the importance of the implementation process and
the need for careful action [30]. To implement the aboli-
tion and to support the subsequent increase in utilization
requires sufficient increases in funding [20,21]. Other-
wise, repeated problems with drug stocks could have a
negative effect on utilization [31], as in Zambia, and on
staff morale, as in South Africa [32]. In Uganda, the disap-
pointing failure of abolition to protect the poor against
poverty could be explained by the unavailability of drugs
in health centres [23]. Leadership and active communica-
tion strategies are also needed. In Madagascar, political
uncertainty and imperfect communication about the abo-
lition were partly responsible for the implementation gap
in rural communes [28]. Front-line health workers and
the population must be informed and work together at
the beginning of the implementation phase. If not, there
is a risk of disillusionment or obstruction on the part of
health staff, as was the case in South Africa [32,33], or
even a tendency to compensate (through informal pay-
ment or private practice) for revenue lost [21]. The issue
of provider incentive must be taken seriously [34].
Given the current state of knowledge, abolishing user fees
is one of the measures recommended by scholars to deci-
sion-makers to redress the inequity of access to health care
[2,35]. The final report of the Health Systems Knowledge
Network of the WHO Commission on the Social Determi-
nants of Health clearly advised to "remove user fees forBMC Health Services Research 2009, 9:89 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/9/89
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public services" [2]. Aid donors like DFID (United King-
dom) [1], the Humanitarian Aid Department of the Euro-
pean Commission [36], and the World Bank [37] now
also favour supporting countries who want to abolish user
fees. WHO Director-General Margaret Chan said, "if you
want to reduce poverty, it makes sense to help govern-
ments abolish user fees" [38]. However, information on
how to implement this abolition remains scarce. To sup-
port decision-makers in West Africa, especially those who
have been implementing the Bamako Initiative since
1987, this paper presents the process evaluation of the
first intervention done in two districts (one million
inhabitants) in Niger in 2006–2007. Lessons drawn from
this analysis may be useful to decision-makers in other
West African countries as well as in Niger, whose govern-
ment decided to extend this policy nationwide as of April
2007.
Intervention Background
Niger is a West African country of 14 million inhabitants.
The United Nations estimated that Niger is "not on track"
to reach Millennium Development Goals 4 and 5 (under-
five mortality rate; maternal mortality) by 2015. The 2015
target for under-five mortality rate is 107 per 1000, and
the latest figure in 2005 was 253 [39]. Niger ranks third
highest (out of 46) in Africa in terms of the probability of
dying under five years of age (WHO, http://www.who.int/
whosis). The maternal mortality ratio of 1.800 per 100
000 live births in 2005 is the second highest in Africa after
Sierra Leone. Concerning poverty, the UN estimated that,
in 1995, 61% of the population had less than one dollar
per day in purchasing power parity (PPP 1993). Forty per-
cent of children under five are underweight, just 33% of
children under five with fever receive antimalarial drugs,
and only 7% sleep under an insecticide-treated net.
Among women, 18% of live births in 2006 were attended
by skilled health personnel, the third lowest rate in Africa
after Chad and Ethiopia. The contraceptive prevalence is
11% (WHO, http://www.who.int/whosis) and 46% of
women aged 15–49 were attended at least once by a
skilled health provider during pregnancy in 2006 [39].
Only 4% of mothers in the poorest quintile used skilled
care at delivery, compared with 63% in the richest quintile
[3]. In 2006, according to WHO, 4% of the gross domestic
product is devoted to health expenditure, 53% by the gov-
ernment and 47% private. Private expenditure on health
is 85% out-of-pocket, i.e., user fees. Per capita total
expenditure on health is $27 (international dollar rate).
In 2005, the government decided to make caesareans free
(implementation started in 2006), but aside from certain
specific pathologies (e.g. tuberculosis, leprosy), all other
services were not.
In 2005, Niger underwent a major food crisis. On this
occasion, the German non- governmental organization
HELP (Hilfe zur Selbsthilfe e.V.) intervened. The staff
observed that, despite food being distributed, malnutri-
tion was still a problem. The NGO decided something had
to be done about health care access, which is one of the
determinants of malnutrition, according to the UNICEF
[40] framework. It was then that the Humanitarian Aid
Department (ECHO) of the European Commission asked
the NGO to organize an intervention aimed at abolishing
user fees in two districts to increase service utilization
among children under five (curative care and medical
evacuation) and pregnant women (prenatal care, deliver-
ies, and medical evacuation). Each of these districts
(Mayahi and Tera, 1 000 km apart) has approximately
500000 inhabitants, a district hospital, and around 20
health centres (Table 1).
A health system in a district in Niger is organized at three
levels. Health posts (where payment for services continues
at the time of the study) serve the population of one vil-
lage and provide very basic outpatient curative and pre-
ventive care. They are managed by a community-based
health worker, who is trained for three months and paid
by the government. Most health posts function poorly
and are rarely supervised. The heart of the health district
system is the health centre (Centre de santé intégré, CSI),
which serves several villages and provides outpatient and
inpatient care, including delivery. Health centres are man-
aged by a nurse and overseen by a community-based man-
agement committee (COGES) made up of members
elected by the villagers. Each COGES is responsible for
managing, on a volunteer basis, cost recovery (CR) reve-
nues generated under the Bamako Initiative (BI). The CSIs
have two systems for processing patients: the BI system,
and free services for the NGO targets. The first level of
referral is the district hospital (where payment continues
for all but services are free for referred children and preg-
nant women), which provides diagnostic services, outpa-
tient and inpatient curative care, and caesarean sections
and serves all the district's population. Cases that cannot
be managed at the district hospital are referred to regional
or national hospitals (where, again, payment continues
and services are free for referred children and pregnant
women). The NGO reimburses the transportation (to the
district) and health services (to hospitals) costs for refer-
rals of children and pregnant women carried out by the
health district's ambulance.
Before the NGO's intervention was inaugurated, a com-
munity awareness and information campaign was under-
taken in the villages, with the help of administrative and
traditional authorities and local leaders. The intervention
was not limited to fees abolition. The NGO wished at the
same time to improve health care quality and availability.
All required drugs and medical supplies were provided by
the NGO on a monthly basis. The NGO's interventionBMC Health Services Research 2009, 9:89 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/9/89
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thus ran in parallel with the BI cost recovery system, which
continued to operate for patients other than children
under five and pregnant women. The COGES managers
ordered supplies from the central store. Thus, the CSIs had
two pharmacies, one for free drugs provided by the NGO
and another for those that were not free. To compensate
for financial losses to the CR system related to the aboli-
tion of user fees, the NGO provided monthly operating
grants to all health centres in both districts (average of 110
US$), and a monthly bonus (45 US$) to nurses, in addi-
tion to their governmental salary (140 US$), for extra clin-
ical and administrative workloads. Clinical and
administrative training was provided to them on-site. In
sum, the NGO's intervention was not limited to abolish-
ing payment, but consisted of a series of measures for
improving quality of care (supply side: drugs, training,
supervision, grants, referral, medical evacuation) and for
implementing the abolition (demand side: fees abolition,
information). While quality of care (notably access to
drugs) is important for improving access to services, the
rest of this article will focus essentially on an analysis of
the implementation of what was an innovation for Niger
and Francophone West Africa – the abolition of payment
for all services for children under five years and pregnant
women – from the specific perspective of the actors, using
an anthropological approach.
Methods
We used a mixed-methods approach, both qualitative and
quantitative, to increase the internal validity through data
triangulation. Three different data collection methods
were used in April 2007.
i) Individual in-depth interviews and focus groups
We questioned three categories of actors, conceived con-
ceptually around the triangle of the decision [39] to abol-
ish fees for certain services. These were the legitimizers
(who formalize decisions), the actants (those who opera-
tionalize those decisions) and the beneficiaries (those
who benefit from the decisions). In-depth (n = 85) and
focus group (n = 8; 168 persons in total) interviews were
conducted using an unstructured guide. The purpose of
Table 1: Comparative indicators for the two districts
Indicator Mayahi Tera
Number of Type 1 integrated health centres (CSI) (2005) 20 23
Management of cost recovery system(a) Independent Single
Total number of inhabitants (2005) 464044 475557
Rate of utilization, curative services (2005) Non Available 0.13
Percentage of babies with low birth weight (2005) Non Available 8
Rate of BCG vaccination (2005) 94 89
Proportion of CSIs with cost-recovery schemes in 2000 96 100
Name of the region(b) Maradi Tillaberi
Proportion of inhabitants living in poverty (2005) 79.7 68.9
Proportion of the poor without schooling (2005) 60.7 71.7
Proportion of households living more than 60 minutes away from a CSI or health post (2005) 45.1 45.5
Majority group Haoussa Songhaï
Rate of vulnerability to food insecurity (2004) minimal minimal
Gross rate of schooling 1999–2000 30.7 28.9
Source: SNIS 2005, Rapport sur le développement humain 2004, Document de lutte contre la pauvreté 2006
(a) Independent fund = each CSI collects and manages the user fees, which are retained by the CSI; Single fund = each CSI collects user fees, which 
are then centralized at the district level and managed by a community manager for all the district's CSIs.
(b) The above data are based on regions, since almost no database in Niger provides district-level data.BMC Health Services Research 2009, 9:89 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/9/89
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the interviews was to elicit the emic view of the impact of
user fees abolition, the implementation process and the
measure's sustainability. Interviews in the national lan-
guage were conducted by a research assistant (physician
anthropologist) from Niger and translated for the two
investigators. Notes were taken systematically of all inter-
views to facilitate the analysis [40]. Because of time and
resource constraints for this evaluation, the majority of
the interviews were carried out in 12 of the two districts'
43 CSIs (30%), i.e., six per district. These CSIs were
selected using criteria that provided contrasting cases [41]
in terms of internal organization, quality of care, and uti-
lization of services by the public. Several interviews at the
levels of the Ministry of Public Health and funding agen-
cies supplemented the information obtained from the
peripheral regions. Table 2 presents the number of inter-
views by category of actor.
ii) Participant observation
We carried out participant observation during the evalua-
tion in these 12 CSIs, taking notes on the situations
observed during periods of one to four hours. We
attended curative consultations, preventive activities
(immunization, growth monitoring, etc.), distribution of
drugs, etc., in an effort to understand the dynamics of the
interactions among the actors implementing this new
intervention – patients, health care providers, and com-
munity authorities.
iii) Questionnaires
During the evaluation, we invited all head nurses from the
CSIs of both districts and members of the two district
health teams (n = 57) to answer a self-administered struc-
tured questionnaire (adapted from [32]) to obtain their
perceptions of the impact of user fees abolition, the
implementation process. and the measure's sustainability.
The majority of the questions used Likert-scaled attitude
indicators, in addition to a few open-ended questions.
The questionnaire was returned by 51 health staff (90%);
among them 82% were male, 73% were between 31 and
50 years old, 95% were nurses and 5% physicians. On
average, they had obtained their medical diplomas nine
years before and had been in the districts for six years.
Data from the health staff questionnaire were analyzed
using Excel©. The qualitative findings were analyzed using
a thematic approach [41]. The preliminary results were
presented to the relevant stakeholders in April 2007 in
Niger, and the report of findings was submitted to the
NGO and the chief medical officer of the health districts
for comment in June 2007. The evaluation was conducted
with the agreement and collaboration of the authorities in
both health districts.
Results
The following sections present the results of the analysis
of this intervention, starting with the perception of its rel-
evance and feasibility, then the implementation process,
and finally the intervention's unintended outcomes.
Perceptions about the judiciousness of user fees abolition
Opinions on the judiciousness of the fees abolition varied
widely depending on the actors and can be summarized in
three categories.
i) For the abolition
The group made up mostly of the populations and the tar-
get groups (beneficiaries) unanimously considered aboli-
tion to be justified. The abolition of fees produced peace
of mind and encouraged people to attend health centres.
In fact, some told us it was common for people to pawn
their fields to obtain the means to pay for health care.
Most persons we questioned did not seem to perceive any
injustice in some people paying and others not. Children
and women were seen as being vulnerable. Easing the
financial burden benefited the entire household, which
everyone considered to be positive.
ii) Yes, but..
Health officials and local government decision-makers
(legitimizers) were in favour of abolition because, in their
view, it led to increased utilization of services. However,
Table 2: Categories of actors and total number of interviews
Individual during in-depth interviews Individual during focus groups
Example M F Total M F Total
Legitimizers Local officials, head of the Ministry of Health 15 0 15 4 5 9
Actants Nurses, members of health committees, NGO staff, local 
manager
2 8 9 3 71 56 4 7 9
Recipients Users and non-users 9 24 33 34 46 80
TOTAL 85 168BMC Health Services Research 2009, 9:89 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/9/89
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they worried that the State was relatively incapable of sus-
taining such a measure. They noted the difficulty of
embedding the abolition of fees into the CR system,
which itself had required a long time to organize and to
get people used to paying. "The NGO's intervention is a
wound that has already done damage," said one adminis-
trator. Thus we were told, in a phrase that was surprising
coming from a Sahelian, that it was better "to teach people
to fish than to give them fish." Their proposal therefore
was that everyone should participate financially. Other-
wise, they would prefer to see abolition introduced grad-
ually, not suddenly.
iii) Against the abolition
Among health workers, opposition to free services was
more widespread, although not total. They would have
preferred to see drugs made available at lower prices and
more accessible, rather than abolishing payment alto-
gether. They asserted that abolition had provoked unwel-
come behaviours among patients: lack of respect and of
appreciation for services rendered, poor maintenance of
health booklets, etc. They believed even a symbolic pay-
ment would be preferable to "disturbing a well estab-
lished system that works well enough." The population's
financial participation was still seen as a way of instilling
a sense of ownership and respect for services. However,
health workers were not unanimous in their opinion,
since the statement "if patients don't pay for services, they
don't value them," did not receive a majority of votes –
33% agreeing completely and 20% not at all (Table 3).
Finally, other health care workers opposed free services
because they said these had increased their workload.
Perceptions about the sustainability of user fees abolition
In terms of sustainability, the general view that emerged
was of abolition as a temporary phenomenon. The inter-
vention was seen as an experiment or a project. One nurse
said, "I have the impression that Niger has become a lab-
oratory for testing all the systems, a guinea pig country."
This view refers back to the experiment conducted in
Niger that is often cited to justify CR policies [43]. In the
popular imagination (after decades of experience with
development projects), a project does not last; it is short-
lived. One respondent from high up in the administration
considered this project to be "assistance". One health
worker at a health post, where free services are not yet
offered as they are in the CSI, believed the State could not
do it. According to him, this abolition was tied to a
project. "You've seen it, it's foreigners who have come and
given these free services," he told villagers, in justifying the
fact that he continued to charge for services. There was
also widespread concern about the State's capacity to carry
forward this abolition introduced by an NGO. "Once
HELP is over, things become risky," one nurse said. Nearly
30% of health workers thought the State could not keep it
up. More than 40% believed the State would not be able
to reimburse free services. Likewise, more than 50%
believed the State will not be able to provide sufficient
quantities of drugs once the NGO and its supply system
come to an end (Table 3). Between scepticism and lack of
confidence, the actors seemed to consider that a State-
managed abolition of fees is destined for failure. The
State's move to extend free services to the entire country
was perceived as political. Among those we encountered,
the political was often equated with deceitfulness. Others
went so far as to propose a substitution: "We might just as
well have HELP do it, because the State can't," said one vil-
lage treasurer.
Strengths of the implementation process
i) A top-down information and community awareness phase
Local authorities largely participated in the dissemination
of information on the abolition. The NGO relied on both
traditional and administrative channels of information to
explain clearly their objectives and the target groups for
their activities. The usual procedures were followed with
utmost respect to involve local leaders and decision-mak-
ers in the information phase. Admittedly, they were
involved very little, or even not at all, in the decisions and
the choice of intervention modalities, which some people,
particularly the nurses, deplored. Nevertheless, their
involvement in the top-down strategy definitely helped in
disseminating information. Also, the NGO was able to
organize space where they could provide local partners
with regular updates on their activities; for some officials,
this brought real added value to this NGO, as compared
to others about which, according to one prefect, very little
was known.
ii) Incentive measures
The NGO perfectly anticipated the reluctance of those
involved in the implementation, by organizing incentive
measures substantial enough to limit abuses – although
not all of them, as we shall see later. The financial data
show that the operating grants to the CSIs were sufficient
to avoid any de-capitalization that would have endan-
gered the COGES' sustainability. According to official
data, the rate of cost recovery remained above 100%. Eve-
ryone involved appreciated that the salaries of the com-
munity fees collectors and the COGES treasurers
remained more or less at the same levels as before. In
some CSIs in Mayahi and all CSIs in Tera, this grant even
allowed these persons to earn more.
iii) Drug supplies
Overall, everyone agreed the supply of drugs was well
organized. This was all the more appreciated because the
State system does not work well. Admittedly, there were
some shortages and occasional problems in adjusting the
supply with unrealistic demands by nurses at the begin-BMC Health Services Research 2009, 9:89 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/9/89
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Table 3: Health staff perceptions (in %)
OUTCOME: Abolition has... Agree completely Agree moderately Agree in part Do not agree at all
...improved service utilization for target populations. 94.1 5.9
...had positive impacts on how I treat patients. 64 30 2 4
...strengthened my professional experience. 43.8 20.8 16.7 18.7
...allowed me to look after patients better. 63.8 23.4 6.4 6.4
...allowed me to treat more people than usual. 100
...allowed me to help those who are most vulnerable. 94 6
...reduced the time spent with each patient. 31.1 26.7 15.6 26.6
...increased my workload in terms of number of patients. 96 2 0 2
...increased my administrative workload. 83.7 8.2 4.1 4
...prevented me from seeing all patients who arrive. 12.8 14.9 17 55.3
...complicated my relationship with patients. 12.2 18.4 10.2 59.2
...obliged me to negotiate with patients who are not sick 
but want drugs.
63.3 10.2 10.2 16.3
...increased the number of patients who try to abuse the 
system.
64.7 13.7 9.8 11.8
...made me feel exploited. 31.3 16.7 12.5 39.5
...caused me to burn out professionally. 30 14 20 36
...made me frustrated. 6 12 16 66
...placed me under pressure from patients to give them 
more drugs.
28.6 24.5 12.2 34.7
...caused me to lose some of my personal income. 4 0 12 84
If patients don't pay for services, they don't value them. 32.7 24.5 22.4 20.4
The population confuses free services with the distribution 
of free drugs.
65.3 14.3 12.2 8.2
As a health professional, I felt personally affected by the 
implementation of free services.
83.7 16.3 0 0
IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS
I was well informed of the procedures for the 
implementation of the free services.
77.6 12.2 0 10.2
Providing free services was more a decision of the funding 
agencies than of the government.
68 6 6 20
The strategies used to inform villagers and members of the 
community about the free services were well organized.
45.1 15.7 13.7 25.5BMC Health Services Research 2009, 9:89 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/9/89
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ning of the intervention. The cost recovery drugs were
often stashed in cupboards while those from HELP were
kept at hand for the many consultations. In addition, new
drugs appeared in the prescriptions of health workers who
understood them: ocytocics, magnesium sulfate and, of
course, sulfadoxine-pyrimethamine, which replaced chlo-
roquine for pregnant women, as well as the other antima-
larials that were replaced. The NGO trained all health
workers in the rational use of essential generic drugs and
in new treatment protocols (such as stopping the use of
chloroquine).
iv) Medical evacuation system
Everyone acknowledged HELP's very significant role in
medical evacuation and in rapid and free response to
emergencies. Evacuation was being done quickly, whereas
before, under the cost recovery system, patients had to
return home to find the money required.
Weaknesses of the implementation process
Beyond these strengths, certain limitations were also
raised. We focus here on the most important, in terms of
lessons applicable to other interventions.
i) The information and community awareness phase
Because the process relied primarily on local authorities
and leaders, others such as community officials, COGESs,
and street level workers were sometimes left out. Thus,
there were breakdowns in transmitting information to vil-
lagers. The NGO left this responsibility to village chiefs
and sometimes to CSI nurse managers, who did not
always carry it out well. One woman said, "When they
introduced free services, they didn't call us together to tell
us about it; I learned about it from women who came for
prenatal visits." Some people only found out at the CSI,
when it came time to pay. Also, the quality of information
was sometimes inadequate, and the announcement of the
free services was sometimes incomplete or poorly
explained to the public. For instance, while some women
we encountered knew what the target groups were, they
did not always know what services were covered by the
abolition.
ii) Incentive measures
Despite the positive aspects of the incentive measures
described earlier, two problems nevertheless arose. The
first concerned the fact that some CSIs had guards who
were paid from cost recoveries. Because these salaries were
not covered by the HELP grant, some CSIs continued to
charge each patient 25–50 F CFA (0.5–0.10 US$) to pay
for the guard. The second problem had to do with the per
diem spiral, a perverse effect that is well known in devel-
opment projects [42,43]. To ensure the CSI managers
would accept the intervention, and on the pretext that,
I was consulted for my opinion on how to implement the 
free services.
32 16 6 46
I think sufficient quantities of drugs have been provided to 
support the free services.
33.3 23.5 19.6 23.6
I think the drugs supplied to support the free services 
arrive on time.
28 40 22 10
The provision of free services would not have worked 
without financial measures to compensate for cost 
recovery.
46.9 18.4 6.1 28.6
The provision of free services could not have worked 
properly without bonuses for the personnel.
36.6 24.5 8.2 30.7
SUSTAINABILITY
After the NGO leaves, the government will be able to 
sustain the system of free services.
29.8 12.8 27.7 29.7
I am confident that the government will be able to 
reimburse free services in the three months following the 
termination of the NGO's project.
12.5 22.9 22.9 41.7
I am confident that the government will be able to ensure 
the availability of enough drugs after the termination of the 
NGO's project.
8.3 18.8 18.8 54.1
Table 3: Health staff perceptions (in %) (Continued)BMC Health Services Research 2009, 9:89 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/9/89
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according to them, this would increase their workload, the
NGO agreed to give them an "incentive" – a monthly
bonus of 20000 F CFA (45 US$). However, the State will
not be able to assume this cost and the workload excuse
does not appear to be justified at the time of this evalua-
tion. The CSI managers were asked to share this bonus
with the other workers, but this was not done everywhere.
iii) Lack of COGES involvement in the system
The COGESs were not always kept informed and rarely
participated in the implementation. Thus, the CSI manag-
ers are the masters of the system. A glaring example of this
low level of involvement was the spontaneous reaction of
the members of one district team to our desire to assemble
the COGES presidents for a group discussion on fees abo-
lition: "But the presidents don't know anything!" While it
may be that most district COGESs do not function well,
they were certainly not strengthened by the intervention
and, in some cases, may even have been destabilized.
iv) Introduction of parallel operating systems
One of the major weaknesses of the project was the crea-
tion of two parallel operating systems, rather than inte-
grating this intervention into the existing system using a
systematic approach to support the district health team.
Unfortunately, as one chief physician told us, "they have
nothing in common." Fees abolition became a vertical
program, like vaccination. Nurses had to manage different
groups of registered patients, some in the CR system,
some in the HELP system. We could even say there were
multiple functions, having observed that CSIs already had
the experience of free services provided by other NGOs
(Islamic Relief, World Vision) or in other programs
(tuberculosis, leprosy, etc.). Concretely, as one nurse said,
in the CSIs there was "a BI table and a free services table,"
where drugs were provided, but "it's very difficult for one
worker to be applying two different management sys-
tems." For many people, this clear distinction was justi-
fied for accounting transparency and for the NGO's
visibility. Also, as one nurse said, "with HELP, the BI was
completely turned upside down." A recurrent complaint
was the cumbersome bureaucratic necessity of filling out
administrative documents in duplicate so the funding
agency could have the specific data it required. Moreover,
district teams were not really involved in the NGO's activ-
ities. They did not receive copies of the drug stocks
received, participate in their distribution, or carry out
coordinated supervision.
v) Lack of action to reinforce the supply side
The abolition of fees undoubtedly acted upon demand by
reducing the financial burden. Supplying drugs to the
CSIs allowed the supply to respond, but only in part, to
the demand. Also, the NGO had not done enough so that
the supply could respond better to increases in demand.
Sending in an intern to supplement human resources was
a late decision, but not a sustainable solution. There was
not enough institutional support in terms of equipping
and reinforcing the health system, despite the supplies of
basic operating materials.
vi) Lack of follow-up in the medical evacuation system
Setting up the medical evacuation system was a major
accomplishment of this project. However, there was not
adequate follow-up to ensure that the women for whom
the NGO reimbursed services at the referral centres actu-
ally received these services at no charge. Some women
complained, "Before, we had to pay 20000 F CFA for gas;
now it's free, but when we get to the Regional Hospital, we
have to pay." Thus, there was the risk that women's hopes,
raised by the organization of medical evacuation services
and free caesareans, would collapse because of poor fol-
low-up and management inconsistency between HELP on
one side and the State on the other.
vii) Coordination of the levels of free service in the health pyramid
Similarly to the problems in the evacuation system, the
modalities for fees abolition had not really been coordi-
nated between the various levels of the health pyramid.
Apparently the funding agency requested that the NGO
not intervene in the hospitals and health posts. Thus, serv-
ices are free in CSIs for women and for children under five,
but if they are evacuated or go on their own to a health
post at a higher level in the hierarchy, or if they come from
a lower level in the pyramid, they have to pay.
Actor's perceptions of outcomes
Table 3 presents the results of the questionnaire adminis-
tered to the health personnel. With respect to patients, the
personnel clearly saw a positive impact of fees abolition
on service utilization; 94% agreed completely with the
proposition of an increase stimulated by the abolition of
fees. All (100%) believed this had resulted in more people
being treated than before. Moreover, they said the aboli-
tion had helped the more vulnerable. They also believed
the abolition had some negative impacts on patients. The
same proportion (two-thirds) thought that: i) abolition
had increased the number of patients who try to abuse the
system; ii) people confused abolition with free distribu-
tion of drugs; and iii) more people now tried to obtain
drugs when they were not sick. For example, one nurse
said, "Some women arrive with the name of the drug they
want." Regarding impacts on their professional practice,
more than 80% of the workers stated that they felt person-
ally affected by the implementation of the abolition. 64%
stated that this had positive impacts on how they treated
patients (improved quality). However, a majority of staff
complained of the added administrative and clinical
workload. But based on our observations in the field, we
calculated that a nurse spent an average of eight minutesBMC Health Services Research 2009, 9:89 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/9/89
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with each patient. This corresponded to about 4.1 hours
of curative work per day in Mahayi and 2.6 hours in Tera.
In Mayahi, the maximum number of consultations per
day after fees abolition was 31, in the fourth quarter of
2006, and 20 in Tera, in the third quarter of 2006. Also, a
majority (55%) did not think the abolition prevented
them from treating everyone who came. In summary, they
told us there was more work but no reduction in quality,
nor selection of patients treated. No consensus emerged
on perceptions of the extent of personal impacts, on oper-
ations, on professional burn-out, or on pressures experi-
enced. Table 4 (based on this questionnaire and
qualitative data) summarizes workers' perceptions of the
intervention's outcomes, as well as what we heard from
women and members of the management committees.
Workers' negative perceptions of women's supposedly
improper behaviours have consequences, women said, on
how they are received by the nurses. One patient
explained,
"Even though it's free, before it started, and now, it's
not the same. Before, when you came, they gave you a
tube of ointment, but now, you bring your child in the
morning and again in the evening for them to put the
medicine in his eyes."
Another woman made it clear that abolition did not
always mean things were free, since, "Before, we gave 800
francs and today we give 200 francs, it's as if they have
lowered the price. So we can say 'Alhamdu lilahi' (Thanks
be to God)." Members of the COGES also were not
pleased that drugs related to the abolition were managed
by the nurses and no longer by the management commit-
tees created by the BI.
Some unintended/undesirable outcomes
Our aim in this section is to describe some unexpected
outcomes provoked by the abolition of fees implemented
during this NGO intervention – a type of analysis rarely
undertaken, according to certain experts in evaluation
[44]. The social actors adapted to this financial innovation
in ways designed to minimize disadvantages to them-
selves.
i) From the population's perspective: medicines associated with the 
distribution of food aid
Two years before this health intervention, the NGO had
begun its action in Niger by distributing food supplies
during the food crisis in 2005. Thus, the abolition of user
fees, and the abundance of new consultants and drugs to
cope with it, was sometimes interpreted by the population
as a distribution of medicine. As with food aid, where the
organizers are very aware of pilferage, "there was lots of
wastage" in the first weeks of the intervention, one nurse
told us. Thus, not knowing whether this windfall would
continue, or to make sure they would have medicines for
when their children actually became sick, some patients
apparently came to the centres to build up a reserve of
medications; "there's a big rush on, because it won't last,"
said a nurse. Thus, according to the nurses, there was a
phenomenon of stockpiling.
ii) From the perspective of the healthcare workers: strategies for 
recuperating the shortfall
Health care workers have always organized parallel sys-
tems to boost their incomes. These parallel practices were
integrated into a system where people paid for everything.
Thus, the act of abolishing some fees and informing the
population of that fact made these strategies more com-
plicated (but not impossible) to carry out. Nevertheless,
the health care workers managed to adapt perfectly well to
the new situation. All of them insisted that the abolition
of fees greatly increased their workload "to the point of
irritation" and reduced the time available for each patient
– a claim that was not borne out by our observations.
These statements are somewhat exaggerated; the most
motivated workers managed to better organize the distri-
Table 4: Summary of the actors' perceptions of the impacts of fees abolition
Women Health workers Members of management 
committees
Positive impacts Promotes medical evacuation
Reduced costs of treatment
Increased number of visits
Earlier visits
Promotes medical evacuation
Emergence of new drugs
Helpful arrival of NGO interns
Brings comfort to the target 
populations
Negative impacts Abolition does not eliminate all costs
Multiple-dose medications require repeat visits to 
the CSI
Health workers' sometimes scornful attitude, 
assuming that women are pretending to be ill to 
obtain drugs
Patients in the target groups 
becoming more demanding
Nurses monopolizing the 
management of inputs
Management committees pushed 
asideBMC Health Services Research 2009, 9:89 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/9/89
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bution of tasks and the roles of the health personnel.
Actually, the strategy behind these statements is to pres-
sure the NGO to recognize that they are "overwhelmed"
and consequently to increase the bonuses they receive for
working in the free system. Some nurses redirect the free
drugs from the NGO into the fee-for-service system that
continues for other categories of the population who are
not beneficiaries of the project. Creating artificial stock
shortages of goods supplied for free by the NGO is
another way of getting around the NGO's rules. By forget-
ting to replenish the stocks of health booklets, nurses will
create a shortage that will allow them to purchase the
same booklets manufactured in neighbouring Nigeria,
which they then resell to patients privately at a profit. Oth-
ers are even more creative. On the pretext that the women
do not take proper care of the health booklets, some
nurses have "required that the booklets be plastified," said
one manager, for the same price at which they used to be
sold. Other nurses write their prescriptions on a piece of
paper that they staple to the booklet, then charge 25
F(0.05 US$) for the staple. We were thus not surprised to
see a nurse open, inadvertently, a drawer filled with coins
in his office. The other solution is simply to charge for cer-
tain services that are free. One woman told us, "I paid
1,000 F (2 US$) for a delivery a few days ago." Another
woman recounts that she paid for her first prenatal con-
sultation; but the health workers had chided her for com-
ing in, because they took advantage of the rural
inhabitants' lack of information to charge them when
they came into town for services, so they said to her, "Hey,
city-dweller, why did you come today? Today is for the
peasants, they pay cash, so you'll have to pay, too." Some
CSIs continue to charge each patient 50 F or 25 F to pay,
we were told, the salary of a guard. Thus, one woman
reported having been charged several fees: "I didn't have
to pay for the awo [antenatal care], but I had to pay for the
booklet. So, I paid 100 francs for the booklet, 100 francs
to have it plastified, and 25 francs for the guard." When
we asked women who were waiting in line in front of a
CSI why the services had become free, the response sug-
gested to us that it was not always so: "It's because you are
here today." We were also told that the abolition of fees
"created problems of misunderstanding between the
health workers and the population."
iii) The provider-patient relationship: lack of understanding
The abolition of user fees had several impacts on medical
practice and particularly on the interaction between pro-
vider and patient. Many patients consider that the medi-
cines supplied in the free system are, in effect, owed to
them by the NGO and made available through the CSIs,
and that health workers are only intermediaries whose
role is to distribute them. This lack of understanding
about the abolition of user fees has led users to develop
strategies for hoarding medicines. Thus, the majority of
nurses (63%) completely agreed with the statement that
abolition required them to deal with patients who were
not sick and wanted to abuse the free system. According to
the nurses, patients have adapted their strategies for
acquiring medicines. Some pretend to be sick, and others,
who arrive with a healthy child, listen to the description
of the symptoms of the mother ahead of them in line and
say the same things that will help them get the medicines
they want. Since many nurses do not systematically take
vital signs (none that we observed did so) and provide
care based only on reported symptoms, the likelihood
that mothers will be given medicines is quite strong. Some
people go from one CSI to another. The massive arrival of
cough syrup was perceived by mothers as a great opportu-
nity because they associate it with vitamins. Thus, as one
nurse reported, "we were obligated to give the cough syr-
ups to the mothers." Moreover, health workers say
patients have become more demanding and insist on
receiving the treatment of their choice. They arrive late at
night, even for a mild cold. We did not observe any such
behaviours during our observations in 12 CSIs and can
only repeat here what was reported by the nurses.
However, patients are not happy, either, with how they
are treated. Complaints about health workers are fre-
quent. For example, they complain that workers ration the
medicines. In addition, they find that the workers are
scornful toward them, treating them as though they are
pretending to be sick and only come to the CSI to get med-
icines.
Discussion
Methodological limitations
It is clearly not our intention to generalize our results to
all interventions in Africa aimed at abolishing fees. Never-
theless, this intervention, while limited to two districts,
involves one million inhabitants and more than 40 health
centres. In addition, this is an NGO intervention (NGO
bias), using a relatively vertical process, and not that of the
State. As the government of Niger decided in 2007 to gen-
eralize the abolition of fees for prenatal care and children
under five years (but not for deliveries), it will be interest-
ing to document the alternative implementation process,
the funding modalities (output-based payment rather
than supplying inputs), and the authoritarian role of the
State (vs. NGO) concerning some health workers' prac-
tices. Still, this study is important to document the various
actors' perceptions and reactions to this innovation, the
abolition of fees. Even if the districts are nearly 1000 km
apart, most of the results were similar in both, with very
few exceptions (more informal payments, a little more
integration in the district health team's activities, a more
advanced community information phase), which gives
them a certain internal validity. The stakeholders vali-BMC Health Services Research 2009, 9:89 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/9/89
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dated and discussed the results at a dissemination work-
shop in 2007.
Practical strategies for managing fee removal
This is one of the first studies to document the process of
abolishing fees by an NGO for children under five years
and pregnant women in a context where cost recovery,
under BI principles, was still operating and ongoing
among those populations not targeted for the interven-
tion. The results show that the implementation of the
intervention, of which fees abolition was the core – but
not the only – instrument, unfolded relatively well, even
if there are still many elements to be improved. Removing
one of the most serious barriers to care for women and
children is a praiseworthy initiative. Everyone, in fact,
acknowledges that in the African context, and especially
with respect to women's rights [45,46], removing this bar-
rier can have significant impacts on service utilization
[29,47-49]. The cost of health care is a major source of
anxiety among women, leading them to postpone care
and bringing the poor deeper into debt [50]. Clearly, the
effectiveness of the project is not due solely to the aboli-
tion of fees, since the NGO also acted on improving the
quality of care which, in the present case, essentially
meant ensuring the availability of drugs, paying bonuses
to COGESs and nurses, and organizing a medical evalua-
tion system. The existence of these inputs is indispensable
to this type of intervention, as is clearly shown in the expe-
riences of Ghana, Zambia and Uganda [17,26,30,51].
In Burkina Faso, where the Bamako Initiative is at the
heart of the health system, integration of the recent policy
of subsidizing 80% of the cost of deliveries and caesareans
within the cost recovery system was also well operational-
ized, even though the impacts on utilization are heteroge-
neous [52]. Maintaining the incentives for health workers,
the integration into the existing system of drug distribu-
tion, and output-based payment managed by the COGESs
enabled the policy to be organized without too much
resistance, despite some trial and error in the strategy's
content. Conversely, in Senegal, the lower-level facilities
never received any financial reimbursement for lost fees
from the start of free deliveries. Researchers also report
shortfalls and delays in the arrival of delivery kits. One
consequence was that health facilities at the district level
lost 4–15% of user fee revenue and coped by "increasing
tariffs for others services" [19] and looking for other alter-
natives.
Obviously, in Niger, improving the quality of care by
these inputs alone is necessary, but not sufficient. There is
still much to be done, especially in obstetric services,
whose quality has been very limited in Niger for a long
time [53,54]. Another very positive aspect of this interven-
tion is the organization of a referral-evacuation system.
We know that, to act on maternal mortality, reducing
financial barriers to access is not enough, and promoting
the evacuation of women is primordial [3,47]. In Niger,
this system functions rather poorly and the two most sig-
nificant barriers are "the hurdles of finding transport and
of paying for it" [55]. The intervention reinforced the
national policy, decided in 2005, of abolishing user fees
for caesareans because these districts do not always have
the means to operate ambulances. Nevertheless, there are
limitations related to the fact that we uncovered cases of
some women who were evacuated to the regional hospital
at no charge, but then apparently had to pay certain
amounts, which is obviously not the NGO's fault. This sit-
uation was also found in Senegal, where products that
were supposed to have been part of the free delivery kits
were paid for by the persons we interviewed [19]. Beyond
the debates on informal payments, this illustrates once
again the importance of considering the health care sys-
tem in its entirety when taking action. Finally, if we go
back to the seven strategies for managing fee removal pro-
posed by the experts [30] based on past experiences, many
were respected in this intervention:
￿ good communications with key actors;
￿ retaining local management of revenues from serv-
ices still being charged;
￿ a good public information campaign;
￿ an adequate supply of inputs (drugs, personnel).
Unintended consequences
Xu et al., in evaluating the Uganda experience, stated that
the abolition of fees can have "unintended consequences"
[23]. Our qualitative approach, based on an anthropolog-
ical type of survey procedure, allowed us to highlight
some of these unintended consequences. While there
must be other types, we focused essentially on the interac-
tions among actors, and particularly among nurses and
patients. In no way could it be said that any of the behav-
iours observed in this study were created by the project.
They existed before and will certainly continue afterward
but the project could have exacerbated them. In Niger,
"the patient-nurse relation is characterized by authority
and passivity" [55], as has been shown by many anthro-
pological studies [53,54]. The practices we describe show
essentially that a change (the abolition) allowed the social
actors to adapt (coping strategies) and transform their
behaviours in line with the new situation in such a way as
to preserve the status quo. We have an empirical demon-
stration of the actors' margin of maneuver, to use Strauss'
expression, exercised by both the nurses and the women.
In South Africa, nurses also claimed that some patients
abused the new system [32]. In Ghana, unlike in Niger, itBMC Health Services Research 2009, 9:89 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/9/89
Page 13 of 16
(page number not for citation purposes)
appears informal payments were reduced after the aboli-
tion in one region, while data on this are mixed in another
[17]. Perhaps the Nigerien context is particular? An analy-
sis of food distribution during the 2005 food crisis in
Niger revealed the same types of coping strategies when
the "development income" arrived [56]. Women "rented"
themselves out as wives to men when food assistance was
aimed at families and not at unmarried men. Malnour-
ished children were considered "lucky babies" in villages
because they opened the door to multiple forms of aid;
some women "borrowed" such children or tried to "pro-
voke diarrhea to make the child thinner", in order to
receive aid. On their side, some unscrupulous workers
sold the bracelets that gave the bearer the right to food aid.
It would be useful in the future to study whether the fact
that user fees abolition is now organized at the national
level by the State and not by an NGO could have positive
impacts on such practices; the issue will be that of the
State's authority.
Street level workers and implementation
Previous studies on the abolition of fees showed that the
role of health workers as street level workers is fundamen-
tal in successfully operationalizing this type of reform,
and that understanding their perspective as implementers
is essential [17,32], as this study of Niger also shows. In
South Africa, health workers had a negative view of free
care implementation [32]; in Ghana and in Zambia, they
worried about sustainability [26,57]; and in Uganda, they
did not appear to be any more satisfied with their work
after the abolition of fees [21]. This study in Niger shows
that the workers were satisfied with how the intervention
had unfolded and, as in other countries, they considered
it to be a very good policy for improving access to services
for the poor. If they seemed more satisfied than others
elsewhere, it may be because their working conditions
actually improved with the arrival of the NGO. Finally,
CSIs had drugs when the national drug supply system
(ONPPC) was operating chaotically, and the financial
incentives were much appreciated. The same strategy was
tried successfully in Zambia, where the districts all
received financial compensation that was apparently suf-
ficient [26] and in Ghana, where 88% of the health work-
ers reported an increase in their monthly salaries, which
was unconnected to the user fees abolition [57]. In all
these experiences, nurses also worried a great deal about
heavier workloads [17,32,57], even when there was very
little evidence of such increases. In this experience in
Niger, contrary to the situation in South Africa [32] and
the assertion of the Nigerien nurses, the hypothesis that
there had been a workload increase due to the abolition
was questionable (except on market days). Based on our
observations done in April 2007, there was still quite a
large margin for maneuver before the nurses would be
overloaded. That being said, the observation period was
brief and it will be important to ensure that any increase
in visits remains workable for the nurses and midwives.
Otherwise, an increase in human resources will become
unavoidable, although not insurmountable, as was dem-
onstrated in Zambia, which recruited more than 1300
new staff (mainly nurses) [26]. Increasing the number of
skilled attendants remains a priority in Africa, if maternal
mortality is to be reduced [3,58].
Context sensitivity, Bamako Initiative and sustainability
The results of this study confirm the lessons drawn from
other African countries about the importance of the proc-
ess. However, the context is different in Francophone
West Africa because the BI (a community-based cost-
recovery scheme) has been in place a long time. Is the
process described in this paper sustainable? Conceptually,
two types of specific events favour sustainability: i) stabi-
lization of the organizational resources allocated to pro-
grams; and ii) risk-taking by organizations in favour of
programs and integration of activities [59,60]. During its
intervention, funds provided by the NGO to compensate
for the loss of revenues from user fees allowed the CSIs to
maintain their levels of cost-recovery (data not shown).
Funds accumulated since the country's inauguration of
the BI were thus not touched (300 million F CFA [650000
US$] in 2002, according to the Ministry of Health [61]).
In Zambia, funds allocated by the government to com-
pensate for lost user fees increased district revenues by
36% on average [26]. In 2007, the Government of Niger
decided to generalize abolition of fees for children under
five (but not for assisted delivery) at the national level and
voted in the necessary budgetary appropriations (in addi-
tion to donor funding). This national application remains
to be evaluated. However, the government had not first
well prepared the implementation phase, nor had the
NGO taken the organizational risk of integrating the abo-
lition into the CR system established by the BI. The local
management committees were not sufficiently involved,
as they were in Zambia [26]. Yet these committees had
spent years setting up the system and informing the local
populations. They also continue to manage the system for
those categories of patients that still must pay. Thus, in
defining the modalities for organizing the abolition, the
national context must be taken into account more care-
fully – even more so, since those who implemented the BI
are the most sceptical about the judiciousness of abolish-
ing fees. The success and the continuation of the abolition
of fees, if the quality of services and the funding are guar-
anteed, may help to restore the population's confidence in
the State and its health care system [62]. Yet, in Niger,
most of the people we encountered had no confidence in
the State. Corruption in many public sectors in Niger,
including in health care [53,54], is well documented [63].
Still, "the population looks up to them [nurses] as repre-BMC Health Services Research 2009, 9:89 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/9/89
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sentatives of the 'State"' [55]. The abolition of fees may be
one vehicle for restoring this confidence.
Conclusion
Abolishing user fees in the context of the BI in West Africa
is not an easy decision. Many Francophone West African
states whose health care systems are based on the BI are
considering it. As of 2007, only Niger had applied this
policy nationwide for children under five, after the NGO
intervention in two districts in 2006–2007. This article
describes the fundamental importance of the implemen-
tation process in the success of such an initiative in the BI
context. In a system where some patients pay and others
do not, the interaction between the two parts of the sys-
tem needs to be carefully considered and organized in line
with the local reality.
After this study, the NGO reacted perfectly and adjusted
its intervention to integrate it better into the national sys-
tem by supporting the State in implementing this new
national policy. In fact, one lesson learned from this study
is that it is important, when introducing a reform, that
planners involve the health system as a whole, defining
service delivery modalities at all levels in the system. This
was the solution chosen by Niger in extending abolition
for children under five to the national level. The State
decided to insert itself into the system set up under the
Bamako Initiative. It must reimburse health centres and
management committees on the basis of a standard
amount per consultation, since the centres need to go
through the usual channels to obtain their drug stocks.
The NGO continues to support the two districts, focusing
its activities on quality improvement and medical evacua-
tions. The impact of this national policy on children
remains to be analyzed, since the State is still debating
whether to abolish payment for deliveries in the country.
In addition, if the worst-off are really to benefit, it is essen-
tial to ensure, at the same time, that quality is improved
and that mechanisms are in place to prevent abuses.
While current knowledge about the impacts of fees aboli-
tion seems clear enough, there is still much work to be
done to document processes in West Africa. This work is
important because ultimately, once the decision is taken,
it is the processes that determine success.
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